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Abstract. An empirical analysis of the distribution of Department of Defense (DOD) per-
sonnel (both military and civilian) across states is developed with a commonly used Public
Choice model of resource allocation in a legislative setting. The model specification employs
Congressional seniority, Congressional committee representation, Presidential electoral votes,
and the per capita dollar value of prime defense contract awards to explain the variation of
DOD personnel across states over time. The empirical analysis is performed over the last
three decades, and the results indicate that this particular Public Choice legislative model
performs well in explaining the variation in DOD personnel allocations across states. The
results also provide some limited evidence of a possible political market between the states
for DOD personnel allocations. This analysis has implications for future testing of whether
the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (established in 1988 under President Reagan),
and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission of 1990 (under President Bush)
were effective in significantly decreasing the legislative politics involved in the selection and
approval process for base closure and realignment.
1. Introduction
The local communities surrounding U.S. military bases enjoy the economic
activity that these bases generate, and the magnitude of this economic activity
varies directly with the size and scope of each base. One would expect these
communities to actively monitor federal budget changes and variations in
activities assigned to their local base. These communities would also have
strong incentives to preserve or even augment the size and scope of local
base activities by influencing government decisions regarding the allocation
of defense personnel and resources.
Although the ability of Congress to directly affect the geographic alloca-
tion of military personnel is somewhat restricted, the legislative processes
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governing the allocation of the Department of Defense (DOD) resources that
accompany these personnel is much less restricted. Additionally, the legisla-
tive process of selecting military bases for closure and realignment has a
direct impact on the subsequent allocation of DOD personnel (both civil-
ian and military) across the states. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that
these communities would find it worthwhile to enter the political marketplace
to try to influence the legislative process that allocates DOD resources and
personnel across those military bases.
These communities will express their respective economic interests through
the federal legislative process via their elected U.S. Congressmen. The rela-
tive ability of a given state constituency to influence the legislative process
is largely dependent on the effectiveness of their respective Congressmen.
Public Choice theory pertaining to the legislative process of representative
governments can be used to develop the appropriate proxies in order to quan-
tify the relative abilities of these communities to influence such legislation.
These proxies can then be used to try and explain the subsequent variation in
the allocation of DOD resources (like budget expenditures, base locations, or
personnel assignments) across constituencies.
The following empirical analysis is an attempt to use political variables
derived from Public Choice theory of the legislative process to explain
observed variation in DOD personnel allocations across states and over time.
Section 2 provides a brief history of the legislative process governing the
selection of military bases for closure and realignment. This section also
describes aspects of Public Choice theory regarding the legislative process
in allocating productive resources. Section 3 explains the model specifica-
tions and proxies that were used in the regression analysis and recalls similar
econometric models that have been used to explain legislative resource allo-
cation. The resulting empirical findings are also described and evaluated in
this section. Finally, Section 4 briefly summarizes the empirical findings and
suggests future avenues of analysis pertaining to the more recent changes in
federal government selection of military bases for closure and realignment.
2. The political market for the legislative allocation of resources
Throughout the 1960s, the criteria governing which bases were to be selected
for closure was largely developed by the Executive branch of federal govern-
ment through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). During this and
subsequent decades, the military needed to significantly decrease and realign
their military base infrastructure across the country in order to increase mili-
tary effectiveness and take advantage of scale efficiencies. Hundreds of com-
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munities surrounding these bases would feel the negative economic impact
under this initiative.
In the early sixties, Secretary of Defense McNamara and OSD unilaterally
developed and subsequently implemented a comprehensive base realignment
and closure program for the U.S. armed forces with only limited consultation
with Congress.1 However, this process was met with vigorous Congressional
opposition. Initially, Congressional efforts at staving off military base closures
were largely ineffective, and many military bases were successfully closed or
realigned. Gradually, enough Congressional opposition was mustered by the
early 1970’s to complicate the base closure selection process and significantly
decrease the number of bases that were closed each year. Congress eventually
passed a bill, signed into law by President Carter in 1977, which required
advanced Congressional confirmation of any planned military base closure
involving more than 300 civilian employees. This bill also required the DOD
to prepare various complex environmental and economic impact studies that
were to be reviewed by Congress. As a result, military base closures ground
to a halt.
This legislative procedure for military base closings remained in effect dur-
ing the creation of the Grace Commission in 1983, which had as one of its
many responsibilities the assignment of looking into ways of possibly increas-
ing the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces, potentially through
the process of decreasing the unnecessarily large military base infrastructure
(as compared to the available levels of military manpower). Even though
very few domestic military bases were actually closed in the late 1970’s and
early 1980’s, there was general agreement between the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government that the national defense of our country could be
made more effective and more efficient by reducing the military infrastructure
across the country (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988).
The result of that investigation prompted the Executive and Legislative
branches to create the non-partisan Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Commission under President Reagan. This commission was created to devel-
op a comprehensive list of military bases to be closed or realigned, using
as the only selection criteria the goal of increasing the over-all effective-
ness and efficiency of the armed forces in providing for the national defense.
The BRAC committee’s list of bases was then to be presented to Congress
for approval, supposedly without modification by Congress or the Executive
branch.
It is easy to see how closing military bases has become so difficult. The
anticipation of lost regional benefits (declining employment rates and lower
aggregate payrolls) and high costs of transition (the necessary community
adjustments to decrease economic dependency) combine to create a difficult
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political climate for military base closures. The positive impact that bases
have on the these communities has been empirically documented in both the
short run (Henry and Oliver, 1987) and the long run (Mehay and Solnick,
1990). The transition costs borne by those communities can be quite high,
but many communities have successfully repositioned themselves.
A recent guidebook published by the OSD’s Office of Economic Adjust-
ment focuses on successful cases of civilian reuse of military base infrastruc-
tures and illustrates the many creative ideas that communities have implement-
ed for civilian reuse of former military bases (Office of Economic Assessment,
1993). Their report details how many of these communities have succeeded
in the long term in replacing most or all of the lost civilian jobs by employ-
ing innovative and flexible policies for new business entities. However, the
transition has proven to be costly to these communities in the short term.
Based on the characteristics of this type of economic environment, it is rea-
sonable to try to quantify the extent to which each state constituency has been
successful in influencing the legislative allocation of DOD personnel across
constituencies, either directly by affecting the base closure selection deci-
sions, or indirectly by influencing the allocation of DOD resources through
the budget and procurement processes. The next step would be to build an
appropriate framework of analysis. In a survey of the development of Public
Choice theory on the legislative politics, Robert Tollison (1988) discusses how
state constituencies can influence the federal legislative process. He notes that
the seniority of a state constituency’s representative has proven to be a useful
and quantifiable indicator of the relative influence that each state constituency
has over the legislative process. For example, Crain and Tollison (1977) found
that seniority of Congressional representation had a significant impact on the
relative level of federal expenditures across state constituencies.
Tollison’s survey article also describes how Public Choice theory has come
to understand the stabilizing role that Congressional committees play in the
legislative process, which is modeled as a type of political marketplace. While
majority coalitions of support are necessary for the successful production of
any given piece of legislation, these coalitions can be continuously constructed
and dissolved in an endless cycling process as the legislative body searches in
vain for a sustainable, long run equilibrium coalition to consistently produce
needed legislation. Shepsle and Weingast (1981, 1987) have developed a
legislative model where the more senior party leadership establishes a clearing
house for political deal making by organizing and sustaining stable majority
coalitions. Stability is attained by creating committees that exercise monopoly
control of the political agenda over which pieces of legislation can be voted
upon, thereby ending the cyclical behavior that would otherwise prevail.
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This model of legislative activity implies that if a given state has Congres-
sional representation on the appropriate committee, this would be a distinct
advantage (all else held equal) for that state to influence the legislative allo-
cation of a productive resources, like DOD personnel. Additionally, if a state
constituency is represented on other important committees in addition to
the Armed Forces Committee, this may further increase a state constituen-
cy’s ability to influence the allocation of DOD personnel across states. For
example, representation on both the Appropriations Committee (a committee
widely believed to play the largest role in the establishment of a clearing
house for the political market in each branch of the Congress) and the Armed
Forces Committee could prove a meaningful combination in determining
DOD personnel allocation across states.
Anderson and Tollison (1991) analyzed non-military federal spending
across states during the New Deal era of the Great Depression, and they
have shown that political patronage through federal expenditures can be dis-
tributed across states via the executive branch as well as the legislative branch.
They use the number of electoral votes from a given state that are received by
the President as an explanatory variable in order to predict the occurance of
future political favors that are received by that state in exchange for having
provided their political support.
With these basic concepts of how political influence over the allocation of
federal resources (or federal costs) is employed, an estimate of the relative
political influence that each state constituency might exercise over base clo-
sure decisions and DOD resource allocations can be developed to explain the
observed changes in DOD personnel allocated across states over time. The
next section explicitly details the regression specification used in the analysis,
and presents the resulting estimates of the relative abilities of each state con-
stituency to influence the political market for DOD personnel allocations.
3. The specification of the model
In the analysis below, it is assumed that the percent change in total DOD
personnel (both civilian and military) in a given state over a given period of
time is going to be a function of the following political variables: 1) the rela-
tive seniority of each state’s Congressmen within their own party (with both
houses of Congress considered separately), 2) representation of each state
on the Armed Forces Committee (with both houses considered separately),
3) the simultaneous representation of each state on both the Appropriations
Committee and the Armed Forces Committee (with both houses considered
separately), and 4) the number of electoral votes cast for the presiding Presi-
dent in the previous election.
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Table 1. Definition of variable (source of data)
1) SENATE The Congressional seniority of a given state’s U.S. Congressmen is deter-
mined within their own party. An ordinal ranking is used, with
2) HOUSE a value of 1 being the most senior. The seniority rank of each Congressman
is averaged with all the other Congressmen in that state. (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, published annually)
3) SARM A state’s representation on the Armed Forces Committee of the Senate or
House, these variables are binary dummy variables with
4) HARM a value of 1 if the state has at least one Congressman on the committee and 0
if there is no representation. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, published
annually)
5) SARMAPP A state’s simultaneous representation on both the Armed Services Commit-
tee and the Appropriations Committee, for both the Senate
6) HARMAPP and the House, these are also binary dummy variables. (Congressional Quar-
terly Almanac, published annually)
7) ELECT The number of electoral votes cast in each state for the presiding presi-
dent in the previous election. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, published
annually)
8) PCTDOD Total DOD personnel as a percent of state population. (All DOD person-
nel data used in the regression analysis were obtained through a special
data request from the Directorate for Information, Operations and Reports,
Arlington, Virginia, and the Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey,
California).
9) PRIME The percent change in the per-capita dollar value of DOD prime contracts
awarded to a state over a four year period. (Prime contract awards data from
Directorate for Information, Operations and Reports, Arlington Virginia)
Additionally, two other explanatory variables are included in this regres-
sion. First, the total number of DOD employees (both military and civilian)
as a percent of the state population is included as an explanatory variable
to determine whether there has been a “leveling out” effect, such that those
states which received disproportionate increases in personnel during times of
national build-up were also hit with disproportionate decreases in times of
decline. Next, the change in per capita dollar value of DOD prime contracts
awarded to each state is included in order to account for the effects that such
procurement and service contract awards might have on DOD personnel allo-
cation across states. This variable would also capture any familiarity that a
given state’s Congressmen might have with DOD bureaucrats. A complete
list of the explanatory variables and their definitions appears in Table 1.
The regression specification used below is similar to previous investigations
into the legislative allocation of productive resources, or even the allocation
of certain economic costs when it is deemed to be in the nation’s best interest
to bear them, in a federal legislative market. An example of the latter type of
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model was developed by Goff and Tollison (1987) in an effort to explain the
variation of per-capita battle casualties suffered across the states during the
height of the Vietnam conflict. Their analysis revealed that both House and
Senate seniority were significant in explaining per-capita casualty rates, and
their model explained 68% of the total variation across states.
The legislative process governing military base closures and DOD resource
allocation decisions implies that Congress considers and debates policies
which will be implemented in future periods. These periods vary from as little
as one or two years in advance for DOD budget appropriations decisions, to
a multi-year schedule of anticipated base closures. For this analysis, the lag
time between Congressional deliberation over these decisions, and the actual
implementation of these decisions, is referred to as the implementation lag.
The time frame with which these decisions are carried out and fully realized
also varies. For example, a base closure decision may be phased in over many
years, where as a particular support activity (and its related personnel) which
is located at the same base could be eliminated within a year. The time that
transpires before the complete impact of a given Congressional decision is
fully realized is referred to as the realization period. Thus, the appropriate
implementation lag and the realization period need to be determined in the
model in order to accurately predict the percent change in DOD personnel
assigned to a given state.
Additionally, when any time series data is used, such as the DOD population
changes in question, the Autoregressive-Moving Average (ARMA) structure
must be determined to capture any year-to-year momentum in the value of
the dependent variable. The potential for serial correlation in the regression
errors must be dealt with before any substantive implications can be drawn
from the coefficients of the independent explanatory variables in the regres-
sion specification. Thus, finding the appropriate regression specification for
this analysis entails: 1) identifying the appropriate realization period for mea-
suring the percent change in DOD personnel, 2) identifying the appropriate
implementation lag for political decisions to begin to affect the change in
DOD personnel, and 3) identifying the appropriate ARMA specification for
the time series data.
Clearly, this is a computationally intensive task. Given that the implementa-
tion lag could reasonably vary from one to three years, the realization period
could vary anywhere from one to five years, and the ARMA specification
could have eight different specifications (assuming that at most, an ARMA
(2,2) would be sufficient), this amounts to well over a hundred possible spec-
ifications to check. Yet the process of narrowing down this field of potential
specifications was not as difficult as it first appeared. This process is described
later in the Appendix.
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The dependent variable measures the percent change in total DOD per-
sonnel in each state over a four year realization period, with the dependent
variable starting in 1964–68 and ending in 1988–92. The Senate and House
political variable series, including all the committee variables, begin in 1961,
to reflect the three year implementation lag. The percent change in prime con-
tract awards over a four year realization period begins in 1963–67 to reflect
a one year implementation lag on the effect that these contracts would have
on DOD personnel assignments.2 DOD personnel as a percent of the state
population begins in 1964 to correspond with the first year of each four year
change in DOD personnel.3
The explanatory variables representing presence on the Armed Services
Committee and the simultaneous presence on that committee and the Appro-
priation Committee, were found to be correlated within the House (0.823)
and within the Senate (0.594). Electoral votes were also found to be corre-
lated with both of the House Armed Forces Committee variable (.521) and
the House simultaneous committee variable (0.583), though these two vari-
ables were not correlated in the Senate. No other pairs of variables generated
correlation coefficients greater than 0.200.4
What emerges from these results is intriguing. Equation #1 in Table 2
explains 59% the total variation in the change in DOD personnel across states
throughout the 25 year time period. The House and Senate seniority variable
coefficients were found to be significant and of the expected sign (since a lower
value of the variable indicates a higher seniority ranking within the party),
where greater seniority implies greater increases (and smaller decreases) in
DOD personnel assigned to that state. For example, the difference between a
high Senate seniority ranking of 1 and a lower ranking of 25 would increase
DOD personnel by 1.8 percent, all else held equal. In the House, a difference
in seniority ranking of 1 and a lower ranking of 100 would increase DOD
personnel by 2.0%, all else equal. This compares with a 1.8 percent decrease
as the average value of the dependent variable observed over the entire time
period.
The regression variables which reflect state representation on the Armed
Forces Committee generated the expected positive sign for their coefficients,
such that presence on the Armed Forces Committee in either house of
Congress tended to increase DOD personnel in that state. However, the Sen-
ate variable failed to generate a significant coefficient at the 90% level, and
the House variable generated only a marginally significant coefficient (at the
85% level). This may be the result of the high degree of colinearity between
the committee variables within each house of Congress.
The simultaneous committee representation variables, however, were found
to have significant coefficients of a surprising sign. It appears that the simul-
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Table 2. Regression results
Dependent variable: Pct. change in DOD personnel over four years
Time period: 25 years, from 1964–68 to 1988–92
No. of observations: 50 states by 25 years = 1250 total obs.
Mean of dep. var.: –1.84%
Confidence intervals:  => 85%  => 90%  => 95%
Equation #1 Equation #2 Equation #3
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Variable (Std. error) (Std. error) (Std. error)
CONSTANT 2.466*** 2.306*** 2.076**
(1.121) (1.092) (1.100)
SENATE –0.071*** –0.073*** –0.058**
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)














PCTDOD –0.401** –0.332* –0.411**
(0.223) (0.220) (0.223)
LAG(1) 0.829*** 0.835*** 0.834***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
LAG(2) –0.152*** –0.150*** –0.147***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Adj. R2 .59 .58 .58
Note. When the variable ELECT is dropped from Equation #1 and
Equation #3, no appreciable change in the sign, magnitude, or sig-
nificance of any other variable coefficient is produced.
taneous representation on both committees seems to generate lower increases
(and greater decreases) in DOD personnel allocated to that state. If one accepts
the assumption that DOD personnel represent a positive economic impact on
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a given state constituency, and that committee representation increases the
relative influence of a state constituency over legislatively allocated resources,
then a likely explanation for this result is that simultaneous representation
on both committees facilitates political trades for legislative support, and
significantly decreases the transactions cost of clearing the political market
for favorable legislation for that state.
This idea is illustrated by the notion that in an environment of DOD down-
sizing, as would be indicated over the time period analyzed by the mean of
the dependent variable being negative, political trades might be made where
larger shares of total DOD personnel decreases are accepted by a given state
constituency in return for their receiving greater Congressional support on
other non-DOD related legislation that was relevant to that state. In this
case, those states with simultaneous representation on the Armed Forces and
Appropriations Committees would be in an advantageous position to initiate
and facilitate such log-rolling trades. The relative magnitude of the coefficient
for this binary variable appears large compared to the mean of the dependent
variable, but interpreting the specific magnitude of the coefficient is made
less trustworthy due to the multicolinearity between the two committee vari-
ables within each house of Congress. One can only have real confidence in
observing the sign of the coefficient.
Another surprising result from this regression is that the number of electoral
votes received by the presiding President has a significant and negative effect
on the change in DOD personnel across states. However, the magnitude
of this coefficient appears small relative to the average percent change in
DOD personnel. Historically, the executive branch of government has been
ineffective in influencing the base closure and realignment process over the
past twenty years, and most of this time period saw a Congress dominated by
the party opposite that of the President. Perhaps this combination has made
DOD personnel allocation a poor indicator of possible political patronage to
be distributed across the states by the executive branch.
The percent of state population employed by the DOD also had a significant
and negative effect on the change in DOD personnel across states. This is
evidence that a leveling out effect has taken place, suggesting that there has
been a conscious effort to draw down greater numbers of DOD personnel from
those states that enjoyed greater concentrations of DOD employees in the
past. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that a three percent increase
in the proportion of DOD employees in a given state will increase the loss of
DOD personnel in that state by 1.2%, all else held equal. The percent change
in prime contract awards per capita also generated a significant coefficient,
such that a $100 increase in per-capita prime contract awards increased DOD
personnel over the four years by 1.3%, all else held constant.
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The results from two additional regression specifications are included in
Table 2 in order to explore the robustness of the surprising sign on the coeffi-
cients for both the House and Senate variables which reflect the simultaneous
committee representation. The high degree of correlation between the two
committee variables within each house of Congress, as well as between the
House committee variables and the electoral vote variable, warrants a compar-
ison of the different regression specifications which exclude these correlated
variables. Equation #2 is the same specification as #1, except that it drops
the electoral variable and the House and Senate variables indicating repre-
sentation on the Armed Forces Committee alone. Equation #3 is the same
specification as #1, except that it drops the House and Senate variables indi-
cating simultaneous committee representation.
Equation #2 reveals that on the Senate side of Congress, the coefficient on
seniority remained unchanged, but the simultaneous committee representa-
tion coefficient fell to only the 85% significance level. On the House side the
seniority coefficient also fell to the 85% confidence level but the magnitude
and sign remain unchanged. The House simultaneous committee coefficient
retained it’s sign and statistical significance but the magnitude declined by
half. The remainder of the coefficients remain unchanged in sign and signif-
icance, with only the DOD contract coefficient showing appreciable decline
in magnitude.
Equation #3 reveals little change in the significance, sign, and magnitude of
the remaining variable coefficients, with two exceptions. The House seniority
variable coefficient decreases in significance to only an 85% confidence level,
and the House Armed Services Committee coefficient becomes decidedly
insignificant.
Finally, dropping the electoral variable from Equation #1 and Equation #3
resulted in no appreciable change in the value or significance of any of the
remaining variables. The comparison of all three specifications implies that
the implications derived from Equation #1 appear to be fairly robust to the
exclusion of any of the highly correlated explanatory variables.
4. Conclusion
Using data on DOD personnel distributed across all 50 states over the last
three decades, the legislative allocation regression model constructed above
has provided limited evidence that a legislative political market for DOD
personnel assignments exists. Although some political theorists specializing
in DOD policy have expressed doubts as to whether legislative allocation of
private benefits is the root cause for observed correlations between political
influence indicators and DOD resource allocations (see Thompson, 1988),
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they still acknowledge that the observed correlations exist. In this study, the
relative seniority of a state constituency’s Congressional representation in
both the House and Senate were found to be significant in explaining the
change in personnel allocated to that state, as might be expected. Changes in
the number of DOD personnel were also found to vary directly with changes in
the per capita dollar value of DOD prime contract awards across states. States
such with greater concentrations of DOD employees per capita were also
found to experience disproportionate decreases in DOD personnel allocated
to their state.
However, the results also indicate that simultaneous state representation
on the Armed Forces Committees and on the Appropriations Committees
generated significant decreases in the relative amounts of DOD personnel
assigned to those states, and these results were obtained for both the House
and the Senate. This is an indication that political markets may exist in
which those states with representation on both committees are more able to
facilitate trades of DOD personnel allocations in the political marketplace.
This log-rolling scenario would suggest that increased support for favorable,
non-military legislation was received by a state constituency in exchange
for bearing a disproportionate share of the nation wide reduction in DOD
personnel. To test this possibility directly, one would need to include changes
in federal, non-military spending in the regression specification to explain
changes in DOD personnel over time. However, such an analysis would
require a simultaneous equations approach, since changes in DOD personnel
would also be included as an explanatory variable in explaining changes in
non-military federal spending across states. This project is left for future
research.
In an era of declining DOD budgets, decreasing civilian and military DOD
personnel numbers, and increased base closures and realignments, the above
analysis would indicate that the on-going military draw down has not been
accomplished without significant political costs. The time period of the analy-
sis above stopped at a point in time where the effects of the BRAC Committee
decisions would begin to become evident in the DOD personnel data. The goal
of this committee was to develop a better base closure selection criteria and
avoid the usual pitched political battles over base closures that have prevailed
historically. A logical extension for future research would be to investigate
whether results similar to those generated above could be found over the
allocation of DOD personnel after the BRAC Committee recommendations
were approved by Congress and the base closures implemented.
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Notes
1. The condensed historical information that follows is summarized in Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), 1988.
2. Changes in the implementation lag for this variable were explored, and changes in the
lag of one year either way had negligible effects on the coefficients for the remaining
variables.
3. Adjusting this lag by one year in either direction had no appreciable effect on the magnitude
or significance of any of the regression coefficients. There may also be concern that these
contracts are themselves likely to be considered substitutes for DOD personnel by the state
constituencies. Evidently, this substitution effect is not strong, however, since per-capita
contract dollars are strongly and positively correlated with DOD personnel across states
(the correlation coefficient between these two variables from 1960 to 1993 is 0.621).
4. The relatively high correlation between the variables suggests a degree of multicolinearity
in the regression equation, which still leaves the OLS regression coefficients as best, linear
unbiased estimators (BLUE) and the R-squared is unaffected. However, the standard error
of the coefficients on the affected variables will be overestimated, their confidence intervals
understated, and their specific magnitudes less trustworthy. See Kennedy (1992) pp. 177.
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Appendix
The criteria used to determine the appropriate specification for this analysis involved
a two-step process: 1) the Akaike information criterion (see Greene, pp. 245, 515)
was used to first determine the optimal ARMA configuration for each specific com-
bination of implementation lag and realization period, followed by 2) choosing the
best combination of the highest adjusted R-squared value and maximum number of
significant independent variables in order to determine the optimal implementation
lag and realization period for each remaining ARMA specification. A general pattern
emerged in the search for the optimal specification. Any moving average specification,
whether isolated or accompanied by autoregressive specifications, always performed
poorly compared to any lower order autoregressive specifications for all of the initial
combinations of implementation lags and realization periods that were tried. Since
dozens of different combinations of lags and periods from across the spectrum were
tried without any change in this pattern, ARMA configurations involving moving
averages were dropped after about 35 combinations, significantly reducing the search
time necessary. Finally, the combination of a three year implementation lag and a
four year realization period stood out as the optimal specification, when coupled with
an AR(2) configuration. This final specification was double checked by noting the
effects of changing the respective implementation lag or realization period first by
one year in either direction, then by two years in either direction, to isolate the effects
of this perturbation. In each case the explanatory power and the number of significant
variables fell off monotonically as the specification grew farther away from the one
chosen.
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